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Abstract
Social balance theory describes allowable and forbidden configurations of the topologies of signed directed social appraisal
networks. In this paper, we propose two discrete-time dynamical systems that explain how an appraisal network converges
to social balance from an initially unbalanced configuration. These two models are based on two different socio-psychological
mechanisms respectively: the homophily mechanism and the influence mechanism. Our main theoretical contribution is a
comprehensive analysis for both models in three steps. First, we establish the well-posedness and bounded evolution of
the interpersonal appraisals. Second, we fully characterize the set of equilibrium points; for both models, each equilibrium
network is composed of an arbitrary number of complete subgraphs satisfying structural balance. Third, we establish the
equivalence among three distinct properties: non-vanishing appraisals, convergence to all-to-all appraisal networks, and finite-
time achievement of social balance. In addition to theoretical analysis, Monte Carlo validations illustrate how the non-vanishing
appraisal condition holds for generic initial conditions in both models. Moreover, a numerical comparison between the two
models indicates that the homophily-based model might be a more universal explanation for the emergence of social balance.
Finally, adopting the homophily-based model, we present numerical results on the mediation and globalization of local conflicts,
the competition for allies, and the asymptotic formation of a single versus two factions.
Key words: Structural balance; Multi-agent systems; Homophily/Influence mechanisms; Nonlinear network dynamics.
1 Introduction
Motivation and problem description Social sys-
tems involving friendly/antagonistic relationships are of-
ten modeled as signed networks. Social balance (also re-
ferred to as structural balance) theory, which originated
from several seminal works by Heider [16,17], character-
izes the stable configurations of signed social networks,
summarized as the famous Heider’s axioms: “Friends’
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Research Office under grant number W911NF-15-1-0577.
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friends are friends; Friends’ enemies are enemies; Ene-
mies’ friends are enemies; Enemies enemies are friends.”
Empirical studies for both large-scale networks [25,11]
and small groups [15,22,33] indicate that social balance
is a type of stable configurations frequently observed
in real social networks. Dynamic social balance theory,
aiming to explain how an initially unbalanced network
evolves to a balanced state, has recently attracted much
interest. Despite recent progress, it remains a valuable
open problem to propose dynamic models that enjoy de-
sirable boundedness and convergence properties. Such
models make it possible to further study meaningful pre-
dictions and control strategies for the evolution of social
networks to balance.
In this paper, we propose two novel discrete-time
dynamic social balance models, in which a group of indi-
viduals repeatedly update their interpersonal appraisals
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via two socio-psychological mechanisms respectively:
the homophily mechanism and the influence mecha-
nism. Loosely speaking, for the homophily mechanism,
the interpersonal appraisals of any two individuals in a
social group are adjusted based on whether they agree
on the appraisals of the group members. For the influ-
ence mechanism, each individual assigns influence to
others proportionally to her/his appraisal of them. Both
mechanisms are well established in the social sciences
literature, e.g., see the seminal work by Lazarsfeld and
Merton [24], and the award-winning book by Friedkin
and Johnsen [13], respectively. For both models, we
characterizes their sets of equilibrium and their dynam-
ical behavior. Moroever, we compare these two models
via both theoretical analysis and numerical comparisons
and give a tentative answer that, compared to the influ-
ence mechanism, the homophily mechanism is a more
universal explanation for the evolution of appraisal
networks to social balance.
Literature review Following the early works by Hei-
der [16,17], static social balance theory has been exten-
sively studied in the last seven decades, including the
characterization of the balanced configurations for both
complete networks [14,5] and arbitrary networks [7,10];
the measure of the degree of balance [4,19]; the cluster-
ing and its relation to balance [6,9]; as well as the rele-
vant partitioning algorithms [8,21]. Numerous empirical
studies have been conducted for different social systems,
including social systems at the national level [15,28], at
the group level [22,32], and at the individual level [33,11].
For a comprehensive review we refer to [38].
In the last decade, researchers have started to incor-
porate dynamical systems into the social balance the-
ory, aiming to explain how a signed network evolves to
a structurally balanced state. Early works include the
discrete-time local triad dynamics (LTD) [2] and con-
strained triad dynamics [3]. These models suffer from
the existence of unbalanced equilibria, i.e., the jammed
states. Other works based on network games are pro-
posed by van de Rijt [35] and Malekzadeh et al. [26]. In
all the aforementioned models, the link weights in the
signed networks only take values from the set {−1, 0, 1}.
Our models are closely related to the continuous-
time dynamic social balance models [23,27,34], in which
the link weights can take arbitrary real values. The
model proposed by Ku lakowski et al. [23] is based on
an influence-like mechanism. Theoretical analysis by
Marvel et al. [27] reveals that for symmetric initial con-
ditions, the probability of achieving social balance in
finite time tends to 1 as the network size tends to infin-
ity. Traag et al. [34] extend the set of initial conditions
to normal matrices and provide a sufficient condition
for finite-time social balance. In [34], the authors also
propose an alternative continuous-time model based on
a homophily mechanism, and prove that the homophily-
based model leads to finite-time social balance for
generic initial conditions. In addition to theoretical anal-
ysis, Ku lakowski et al. [23] investigate numerically the
relation between the formation of factions and the initial
appraisal distribution, for the influence-like model. The
corresponding results for the homophily-based model
is unavailable in previous literature. A non-negligible
shortcoming of all the models mentioned above is that,
the interpersonal appraisals diverge to infinity in finite
time. To remedy this shortcoming, in [23], the authors
impose a predetermined upper bound of the interper-
sonal appraisals. As the consequence, the magnitudes of
all the appraisals converge to the predetermined upper
bound, see the rigorous analysis in [36]. In addition to
those continuous-time models, Jia et al. [20] propose
a discrete-time model, with a generalized notion of so-
cial balance and a modified influence mechanism, and
establish its convergence to the generalized balance.
Contributions The contribution of this paper are
manifold. Our paper is the first to propose two well-
behaved discrete-time models that explain the evolution
of interpersonal appraisal networks towards the classic
Heider’s social balance, via the homophily and the in-
fluence mechanisms respectively. Both mechanisms are
cast in the language of influence systems; indeed the
key novelty is the formulation of appropriate influence
matrices such that both models are well-behaved and
enjoy the desirable properties of bounded evolution and
convergent appraisals.
Regarding the theoretical analysis, we first fully
characterizes the two models’ respective equilibrium
sets, each of which turn out to include all possible
balanced configurations in terms of sign pattern. Sec-
ond, we establish the equivalence relations among the
non-vanishing appraisal condition, the convergence of
appraisal networks to all-to-all balanced configurations,
and the achievement of social balance in finite time.
Numerical study of our both models leads to various
insightful results. First, Monte-Carlo validations indi-
cate that the non-vanishing appraisal condition holds
for generic initial conditions, while, for the influence-
based model, the non-vanishing appraisal condition
holds almost surely if the initial appraisals satisfy
some generalized notion of symmetry. Second, further
simulation results show that, for the influence-based
model with generic initial conditions, the probability
that the appraisal network converges to social balance
monotonically decays to 0 as the network size tends
to infinity. Based on this observation we conclude that
the homophily-based model might be a more universal
explanation than the influence-based model for the evo-
lution to social balance. Third, for the homophily-based
model, we numerically investigate its behavior under
2
perturbation when the appraisal network is composed
of multiple structurally balanced subnetworks. Such
numerical study reveals some insightful and realistic
interpretations such as the escalation and mediation of
local conflicts. Finally, we study by simulation the effect
of the initial appraisal distribution on the formation of
factions, i.e., whether an appraisal network converges
to two antagonistic factions or an all-friendly network.
The main advantage of our models, compared with
the previous continuous-time models [23,34], is that our
models are well-behaved, in the sense that our models
enjoy the desirable property of convergent appraisals,
(as opposed to the undesirable property of finite-time
divergence). The convergence property makes it possi-
ble to characterize the systems’ fixed points and their
stability, as well as the transition from one equilibrium
to another. In our models, the convergent appraisals are
due to the introduction of either homophily or interper-
sonal influence networks, which also provide a connec-
tion between the field of dynamic social balance and the
field of opinion dynamics with antagonistic interactions,
e.g. [1]. In addition, our models have the desired prop-
erty that they are invariant under scaling, i.e., if a solu-
tion is scaled by a constant, it remains a solution. This
feature is particularly important in the modelling of so-
cial systems, in which quantities are usually meaningful
only in the relative sense. Compared with the model pro-
posed in [23] with bounded evolution, our models do not
rely on any predetermined bound to prevent divergence
and the asymptotic appraisals in our models are deter-
mined by the initial condition rather than the manually
determined bound. Some additional advantages of our
models are discussed in Section 5.1.
Organization Section 2 introduces some notations
and basic concepts. Section 3 and 4 contain the theo-
retical analyses of our models. Section 5 provides fur-
ther discussions and numerical results. Section 6 gives
the conclusion. An auxiliary lemma is provided in the
Appendix. Some proofs are provided in the technical
report [30] with full details.
2 Notations and basic concepts
Notations Some frequently used notations are defined
in Table 1. The following sets will be used throughout
this paper:
Snz-row ={X ∈ Rn×n | for every i,Xi∗ 6= 0>n }, (1)
S+s-symm ={X ∈ Rn×n | sign(X) = sign(X)> (2)
and Xii > 0 for every i},
S+rs-symm ={X ∈ S+s-symm | there exists γ  0n (3)
such that diag(γ)X =
(
diag(γ)X
)>}.
By definition, S+rs-symm ⊂ S+s-symm ⊂ Snz-row. In addition,
S+s-symm and S+rs-symm are both invariant under permuta-
tions. That is, given any X ∈ S+s-symm (or X ∈ S+rs-symm
resp.) and a permutation matrix P , we have PXP> ∈
S+s-symm (or PXP> ∈ S+rs-symm resp.).
Table 1
Notations frequently used in this paper
1n (0n) the all-ones (all-zeros) n× 1 vector
R (Z≥0) set of real numbers (non-negative integers)
 (≺) entry-wise greater than (less than)
|X| entry-wise absolute value of matrix X
sign(X) entry-wise sign of X, i.e., sign(X)ij = 1 if
Xij > 0, sign(X)ij = −1 if Xij < 0, and
sign(X)ij = 0 if Xij = 0.
|X|max the max norm of X, i.e, maxi,j |Xij |
Xi∗ (X∗i) the i-th row (column) vector of X
G(X) weighted digraph associated with adjacency
matrix X. We allow negative link weights.
That is, if Xij < 0, then there exists a link in
G(X) from i to j with negative weight Xij .
Appraisal matrices and social balance Given a
group of n agents, the interpersonal appraisals are given
by the appraisal matrix X ∈ Rn×n. The sign ofXij deter-
mines whether i’s appraisal of j is positive, i.e., i “likes”
j, or negative, i.e., i “dislikes” j. The magnitude of Xij
represents the intensity of the sentiment. WhenXij = 0,
the appraisal is one of indifference. The diagonal entry
Xii represents agent i’s self-appraisal. The weighted di-
graph G(X) associated to X as the adjacency matrix is
referred to as the appraisal network.
Definition 2.1 (Social balance [14,17]). An appraisal
network G(X) satisfies social balance, or, equivalently,
is structurally balanced, if the appraisal matrix X sat-
isfies the following properties: (S1) Xii > 0 for any
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; (S2) sign(Xij) sign(Xjk) sign(Xki) = 1
for any i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
According to [14], a structurally balanced appraisal
network either has only one faction in which the inter-
personal appraisals are all positive, or is composed of
two antagonistic factions such that individuals in the
same faction positively appraise each other while all the
inter-faction appraisals are negative.
Lemma 2.2 (Equivalent conditions for social bal-
ance). For any X ∈ Rn×n such that all of its en-
tries are non-zero, G(X) satisfies social balance if and
only if it satisfies (S1) in Definition 2.1 and (S3):
sign(Xi∗) = ± sign(Xj∗), for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Moreover, for G(X) satisfying social balance, X is sign-
symmetric, i.e., sign(X) = sign(X)>.
Proof. Suppose that (S1) and (S3) hold. For any
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i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, sign(Xi∗) = δ sign(Xj∗), where δ
is either −1 or 1. Therefore, sign(Xij) sign(Xji) =
δ2 sign(Xjj) sign(Xii) = 1, i.e., sign(Xij) = sign(Xji).
Moreover, for any k, since sign(Xij) = δ sign(Xjj) and
sign(Xjk) = δ sign(Xik), we have
sign(Xij) sign(Xjk) sign(Xki)
= δ2 sign(Xjj) sign(Xik) sign(Xki) = 1.
Therefore, (S1) and (S3) imply (S1) and (S2) in Defini-
tion 2.1, as well as the sign symmetry of X.
Now suppose (S1) and (S2) in Definition 2.1 hold.
The sign symmetry of X is obtained by letting k = j
in (S2). Moreover, due to the sign symmetry and (S2),
we obtain sign(Xij) sign(Xjk) sign(Xik) = 1. Therefore,
sign(Xik) sign(Xjk) does not depend on k and is equal to
sign(Xij) ∈ {−1, 1}. That is, sign(Xi∗) = ± sign(Xj∗)
for any i and j. This concludes the proof.
3 Homophily-based Model
In this and the next section, we propose and analyze
two dynamic social balance models respectively. These
two models are distinct in the microscopic individual
interaction mechanisms.
Definition 3.1 (Homophily-based model). Given an
initial appraisal matrix X(0) ∈ S+s-symm ⊂ Rn×n, the
homophily-based model is defined by:
X(t+ 1) = diag(|X(t)|1n)−1X(t)X>(t). (4)
Remark 3.2 (Interpretation). Equation (4) updates the
appraisals based on what can be considered as the ho-
mophily mechanism. For any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, agent i’s
appraisal of agent j at time step t + 1 depends on to
what extend they are in agreement with each other on the
appraisals of all the agents in the group. For any k ∈
{1, . . . , n}, if sign(Xik(t)) = sign(Xjk(t)), then the term
Xik(t)Xjk(t) contributes positively toXij(t+1), and vice
versa. The matrixW (X(t)) = diag(|X(t)|1n)−1X(t) can
be regarded as the influence matrix constructed from the
appraisals through homophily mechanism. Since Xij(t+
1) =
∑
kWik(t)Xjk(t), each |Wik(t)| represents how
much weight individual i assigns to the agreement on the
appraisal of individual k. Note that the entry-wise ab-
solute value, i.e., |W (t)|, is row-stochastic. Such type of
influence matrices has been widely studied in the opinion
dynamics with antagonism, see [18,37,31].
The proposition below presents some useful results on
the finite-time behavior of the homophily-based model.
Proposition 3.3 (Invariant set and finite-time behav-
ior of HbM). Consider the dynamical system (4) and
define fhomophily(X) = diag(|X|1n)−1XX>. Pick X0 ∈
Snz-row. The following statements hold:
(i) the map fhomophily is well-defined for any X ∈
Snz-row and maps Snz-row to S+s-symm;
(ii) the solution X(t), t ∈ Z≥0, to equation (4) from
initial condition X(0) = X0 exists and is unique;
(iii) the max norm of any solution X(t) satisfies
|X(t+ 1)|max ≤ |X(t)|max ≤ |X(0)|max ;
(iv) for any c > 0, the trajectory cX(t) is the solution to
equation (4) from initial condition X(0) = cX0.
Proof. For simplicity, denote X+ = fhomophily(X).
For any X ∈ Snz-row, since, for any i and j, X+ij =
1
‖Xi∗‖1
∑
kXikXjk and ‖Xi∗‖1 > 0, fhomophily(X) is
well-defined. Moreover,
X+ii =
1
‖Xi∗‖1
∑
k
XikXik =
‖Xi∗‖22
‖Xi∗‖1 > 0, and
X+ij =
‖Xj∗‖1
‖Xi∗‖1X
+
ji , for any i and j.
Therefore, fhomophily maps Snz-row to S+s-symm. This
concludes the proof of statement (i). Statements (ii)
is a direct consequence of statement (i), since, for
any t ∈ Z≥0, X(t) ∈ Snz-row defines a unique
X(t+ 1) = fhomophily(X(t)) ∈ S+s-symm. In addition,
|X+ij |≤
1
‖Xi∗‖1
n∑
k=1
∣∣XikXjk∣∣≤ 1‖Xi∗‖1
n∑
k=1
∣∣Xik∣∣∣∣Xjk∣∣
≤ max
k
|Xjk| ≤ |X|max
immediately leads to statement (iii). Finally, state-
ment (iv) is obtained by replacing X(t) with cX(t) on
the right-hand side of equation (4).
According to statement (iii) of Proposition 3.3, for any
a > 0, the set Snz-row ∩ [−a, a]n×n is positively invari-
ant under dynamics (4). This desired bounded-evolution
property makes our model substantially different from
some previous models, in which X(t) diverges in finite
time [27,34].
The theorem below characterizes the set of fixed points
of system (4), i.e, the steady-state appraisal matrix X
satisfying X = fhomophily(X). Fixed points are sociolog-
ically interesting because they correspond to the states
that can often be observed in the real world.
Theorem 3.4 (Fixed points and balance). Consider the
4
dynamical system (4) in domain Snz-row. Define
Qhomophily
=
{
PY P> ∈ Snz-row
∣∣∣P is a permutation matrix,
Y is a block diagonal matrix with blocks of
the form αbb>, α > 0, b ∈ {−1,+1}m, m ≤ n
}
.
Then
(i) Qhomophily is the set of all the fixed points of (4),
(ii) for any X ∈ Qhomophily, G(X) is composed by iso-
lated complete subgraphs that satisfy social balance.
Proof. We first prove that anyX∗ ∈ Qhomophily is a fixed
point of system (4). For any α > 0 and b ∈ {−1,+1}n,
the matrix Y = αbb> satisfies
fhomophily(Y ) = diag(nα1n)
−1α2bb>bb> = αbb> = Y.
This arguments extend to block diagonal matrices Y .
By the definition of fhomophily, for any block diagonal
matrix Y = diag(Y (1), . . . , Y (K)), Y = fhomophily(Y ) if
and only if Y (i) = diag(|Y (i)|1n)−1Y (i)Y (i)> for any i.
Therefore, Y is a fixed point of system (4) if each Y (i)
in Y = diag(Y (1), . . . , Y (K)) is a ni × ni matrix of the
form αib
(i)b(i)
>
, with αi > 0, b
(i) ∈ {−1,+1}ni , and
n1 + · · · + nK = n. Moreover, given any fixed point Y ,
for any permutation matrix P ∈ Rn×n,
PY P> = P diag(|Y |1n)−1Y Y >P>
= diag(|PY P>|1n)−1(PY P>)(PY P>)>
= fhomophily(PY P
>).
Therefore, any X∗ ∈ Qhomophily is a fixed point of (4).
Now we prove by induction that Qhomophily is the set
of all the fixed points of system (4). For the trivial case
of n = 1, Qhomophily represents the set of all the posi-
tive scalars and one can easily check that any positive
scalar X is a fixed point of system (4) with n = 1.
Suppose statement (i) holds for any system with dimen-
sion n˜ < n. For system (4) with dimension n, suppose
X is a fixed point, i.e., X = fhomophily(X). For any
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, by comparing the (i, j)−th and the
(j, i)−th equations of X = fhomophily(X), we conclude
thatXij andXji always have the same sign. In addition,
since Xii =
∑n
k=1X
2
ik
/‖Xi∗‖1, we have Xii > 0 for any
i. Since X is a fixed point of fhomophily, we have that, for
any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
|Xij | = 1‖Xi∗‖1
∣∣∣∑
k
XikXjk
∣∣∣
≤ 1‖Xi∗‖1
∑
k
|Xik||Xjk| ≤ |X|max .
Moreover, there exists (i, j) such that |Xij | = |X|max.
For any such (i, j), either of the following two cases hold:
Case 1: i = j and there does not exist k 6= i such that
|Xik| = |X|max. In this case, |Xii| = |X|max. Since
|Xii| = 1‖Xi∗‖1
∣∣∣∑
k
XikXik
∣∣∣
≤ 1‖Xi∗‖1
∑
k
|Xik||Xik| ≤ |X|max ,
in order for |Xii| = |X|max to hold, Xi∗ must satisfy|Xik| = |X|max, for any k such that Xik 6= 0. By the
definition of Case 1, we conclude that there does not
exist k 6= i such that Xik 6= 0. Therefore, there exists a
permutation matrix P such that
PXP> =
[
|X|max 0>n−1
0n−1 X˜(n−1)×(n−1)
]
.
Since PXP> is also a fixed point of system (4), one can
check that X˜ satisfies X˜ = diag(|X˜|1n)−1X˜X˜>. There-
fore, X˜ is a fixed point of system (4) with dimension
n−1. Since we have assumed that statement (i) holds for
dimension n˜ < n, there exists an (n−1)×(n−1) permu-
tation matrix P˜ and a block diagonal Y˜ , with blocks of
the form αbb>, where α > 0, b ∈ {−1,+1}m, m < n−1,
such that X˜ = P˜ Y˜ P˜>. Therefore,
X = P>
[
1 0>n−1
0n−1 P˜
][
|X|max 0>n−1
0n−1 Y˜
][
1 0>n−1
0n−1 P˜
]>
P.
The matrix P>
[
1 0>n−1
0n−1 P˜
]
is also a permutation ma-
trix. Therefore X ∈ Qhomophily.
Case 2: j 6= i and |Xij | = |X|max. We first define
some notations used in the following proof: For any k,
let θk = {` | Xk` 6= 0} and |θk| be the cardinality of the
set θk. Note that, since X = fhomophily(X) ∈ S+s-symm, k
is always in θk and Xkk > 0. Let X`∗,θk ∈ R1×|θk| be the
`-th row vector of X with all the X`p entries such that
p /∈ θk removed.
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We point out a general result that, for any k and `, if
|Xk`| = 1‖Xk∗‖1
∣∣∣ n∑
p=1
XkpX`p
∣∣∣ = |X|max ,
then, for the second equality to hold, X must satisfy
that: 1) θk ⊂ θl; 2) |X`p| = |X|max for any p ∈ θk;
3) sign(X`∗,θk) = ± sign(Xk∗,θk). Therefore, for the
i, j indexes such that |Xij | = |X|max and i 6= j,
we have: |Xjk| = |X|max, for any k ∈ θi; θi ⊂ θj ;
and sign(Xj∗,θi) = ± sign(Xi∗,θi). Since i ∈ θi and
X = fhomophily(X), we obtain |fhomophily(X)ji| =
|Xji| = |X|max. Therefore, |fhomophily(X)ik| = |Xik| =|X|max, for any k ∈ θj , and θj ⊂ θi, which in turn
leads to θi = θj and |Xik| = |X|max for any k ∈ θi.
Therefore, for any k ∈ θi, |fhomophily(X)ik| = |x|max,
which implies |Xk`| = |X|max for any l ∈ θi. Since|fhomophily(X)k`| = |Xk`|, we further obtain that θk ⊂ θl
and sign(Xk∗,θk) = ± sign(X`∗,θk). Moreover, due to
the fact that the indexes k and l are interchangeable,
we conclude that, for any k, l ∈ θi: a) θk = θl = θi; b)
|Xk`| = |X|max; c) sign(Xk∗) = ± sign(X`∗).
If |θi| = n, let α = X11 and b = sign(X1∗)>, then we
have X = αbb>. If |θi| < n, there exists a permutation
matrix P such that
PXP> =
[
X(θi) 0|θi|×(n−|θi|)
0(n−|θi|)×|θi| X˜
]
,
where X(θi) is a |θi| × |θi| matrix. Moreover, X(θi) =
|X|max bb>, where b = sign(Xi∗,θi)>. Following the same
line of argument for Case 1, we know that X˜ is of the form
P˜ Y˜ P˜> and thereby X ∈ Qhomophily. This concludes the
proof for statement (i).
For any X∗ ∈ Qhomophily, there exists a per-
mutation matrix P and a block diagonal matrix
Y = diag(Y (1), . . . , Y (K)) such that X∗ = PY P>.
Note that G(Y ) has exactly the same topology as
G(X), but with the nodes re-indexed. Therefore, we
only need to analyze the structure of G(Y ). The graph
G(Y ) is made up of K isolated complete subgraphs
and Y (i) = αib
(i)b(i)
>
for each such subgraph G(Y (i)),
where b(i) = (b
(i)
1 , . . . , b
(i)
ni )
>. Therefore, according to
Lemma 2.2, each subgraph G(Y (i)) satisfies social bal-
ance. This concludes the proof for statement (ii).
Remark 3.5 (Social balance with multiple isolated sub-
graphs). An appraisal matrix X ∈ Qhomophily can be
a block-diagonal matrix diag(X1, . . . , Xk) and thus cor-
responds to an appraisal network G(X) composed of k
isolated subgraphs, each of which satisfies social balance
as in Definition 2.1. With the notion of social balance
extended to graphs with multiple isolated subgraphs, in
terms of sign pattern, the set of fixed points X of the
homophily-based model (4) corresponds to exactly the set
of all the possible structurally balanced configurations of
the appraisal network G(X). Such characterization of
fixed points is impossible in the previous continuous-time
models [27,34] since those models diverge in finite time.
Moreover, for any X ∈ Qhomophily such that G(X) has k
isolated subgraphs, X is a rank-k matrix.
Before presenting the main results on the convergence
of the appraisal matrix X(t) to social balance, we define
a property of X(t) as the solution to equation 4.
Definition 3.6 (Non-vanishing appraisal condition). A
solution X(t) satisfies the non-vanishing appraisal con-
dition if lim inf
t→∞ mini,j
|Xij(t)| > 0.
Theorem 3.7 (Convergence and social balance in
HbM). Consider the homophily-based model given by
equation (4). The following statements hold:
(i) Each element in Qhomophily of rank one is a locally
stable fixed point of fhomophily;
(ii) For any X(0) ∈ Snz-row, the following three state-
ments are equivalent:
(a) the solutionX(t) satisfies the non-vanishing ap-
praisal condition;
(b) there exists t0 > 0 such that G(X(t)) satisfies
social balance for all t ≥ t0;
(c) there exists X∗ ∈ Qhomophily of rank one such
that limt→∞X(t) = X∗.
Proof: For simplicity of notations, let |X|min =
mink,l |Xk,l|. We start by proving the following two
claims. For any given t0 ≥ 0, if all the entries of X(t0)
are non-zero and G(X(t0)) satisfies social balance, then,
C.1) for any t ≥ t0, G(X(t)) satisfies social balance and
sign(X(t)) = sign(X(t0));
C.2) for any t ≥ t0, |X(t)|max is non-increasing and|X(t)|min is non-decreasing.
To prove claim C.1), it suffices to prove that G(X(t0 +
1)) satisfies social balance and sign(X(t0 + 1)) =
sign(X(t0)), as the cases for t ≥ t0 + 1 follow by
induction. For any i and j, since G(X(t0)) satis-
fies social balance, according to Lemma 2.2, we have
sign(Xi∗(t0)) = ± sign(Xj∗(t0)). In addition, we have
Xjj(t0) > 0 for any j. Therefore,
sign
(
Xij(t0+1)
)
=sign
( 1
‖Xi∗(t0)‖1
n∑
k=1
Xik(t0)Xjk(t0)
)
= sign
(
Xij(t0)Xjj(t0)
)
=sign
(
Xij(t0)
)
,
for any i and j. This concludes the proof for claim C.1).
For any t ≥ t0, since G(X(t)) satisfies social balance,
|Xij(t+1)| = 1‖Xi∗(t)‖1
n∑
k=1
|Xik(t)||Xjk(t)| for any i, j,
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we have |X(t+ 1)|min ≥ |X(t)|min ≥ |X(t0)|min and|X(t+ 1)|max ≤ |X(t)|max ≤ |X(t0)|max.
Now we prove statement (i), i.e., eachX∗ ∈ Qhomophily
with rank 1 is locally stable. Let X∗ = αbb>, where
α > 0 and b ∈ {−1,+1}n. For any matrix ∆ ∈ Rn×n
such that |∆|max = ζ < α, we have sign(X∗ + ∆) =
sign(X∗). Due to claim C.1) and C.2), we know that,
for X(0) = X∗ + ∆, X(t) satisfies that, for any t ≥ 0:
(1) sign(X(t)) = sign(X(0)) = sign(X∗); (2) α − ζ ≤
|X(t)|min ≤ |X(t)|max ≤ α + ζ. Therefore, for any i
and j, Xij(t) is of the form αij(t) sign(X
∗
ij), where 0 <
α− ζ ≤ αij(t) ≤ α+ ζ. We thereby have
|X(t)−X∗|max = maxij
∣∣αij(t) sign(X∗ij)− α sign(X∗ij)∣∣
= max
ij
|αij(t)− α| ≤ ζ.
Therefore, for any  > 0, there exists ζ = min{α2 , 2}
such that, for any X(0) satisfying |X(0)−X∗|max < ζ,|X(t)−X∗|max< for any t≥0, i.e., X∗ is locally stable.
Now we prove (ii)(a)⇒ (ii)(b). We first establish the
convergence of the solution X(t) to some set of struc-
turally balanced states via the LaSalle invariance prin-
ciple. For simplicity, denote X+ = fhomophily(X). The
map fhomophily(X) is continuous for any X ∈ S+s-symm
and, by Proposition 3.3, for any given X(0) ∈ S+s-symm,
|X(t)|max ≤ |X(0)|max for any t ∈ Z≥0. In addition, let-
ting δ = lim inf
t→∞ mini,j
|Xij(t)| > 0, we see that there ex-
ists t˜ ∈ Z≥0 such that min
i,j
|Xij(t)| ≥ δ/2 for any t ≥ t˜.
Therefore, the set
Gc =
{
X ∈ S+s-symm
∣∣∣ min
i,j
|Xij | ≥ δ/2,
|X|max ≤ |X(0)|max
}
is a compact subset of S+s-symm and X(t) ∈ Gc for any
t ≥ t˜. Thirdly, define V (X) = |X|max. The function V is
continuous on S+s-symm and, by Proposition 3.3, satisfies
V (X+)− V (X) ≤ 0 for any X ∈ S+s-symm. According to
the extended LaSalle invariance principle in Theorem 2
of [29], X(t) converges to the largest invariant set M of
the set E = {X ∈ Gc | V (X+)− V (X) = 0}.
Now we characterize the largest invariant set M . For
any X ∈ M ⊂ E, V (X+) = V (X) = |X|max. Suppose
|X+ij | = max
k,`
|X+k`|. Since X+ = fhomophily(X), we have
|X+ij | ≤
1
‖Xi∗‖1
n∑
`=1
|Xi`||Xj`| ≤ |X|max . (5)
In order for all these inequalities to hold with equality
and noticing that |Xi`| > 0 for any ` since X ∈ Gc, X
must satisfy that
(a) Xi∗ andXj∗ have the same or opposite sign pattern,
i.e., sign (Xi∗) = ± sign (Xj∗),
(b) All entries of Xj∗ have the magnitude |X|max.
Therefore, for any X ∈ E, there exist some i and j such
that the aforementioned conditions (a) and (b) hold.
Moreover, since the set M is invariant, X ∈ M im-
plies X+ ∈ M ⊂ E. Applying Condition (b) to X+,
there exists a j˜ such that, for any p, |X+
j˜p
| = |X+|max =
|X|max. In order for |X+j˜p| = |X|max to hold, following
the same argument on the conditions such that the in-
equalities (5) become equalities, we know that, for any p,
sign (Xj˜∗) = ± sign (Xp∗) and |Xpk| = |X|max for any k.
As these relationships hold for any p, we conclude that
for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Xi∗ and Xj∗ must have the
same or the opposite sign pattern. Let α = |X|max and
b = sign(X>1∗). Each row of X is thereby equal to either
αb> or −αb>. Therefore, X is of the form X = αcb>,
where c ∈ {−1, 1}n. Moreover, since all the diagonal
entries of X are positive, the column vector c satisfies
cibi = 1 for any i, which implies c = b. In short, we have
proved that X ∈M leads to X = αbb>. In addition, by
Theorem 3.4, any matrix X = αbb>, with α > 0 and
b ∈ {−1, 1}n, is a fixed point of fhomophily and is thus
invariant. Therefore, we conclude the compactness of
M =
{
X = αbb>
∣∣∣ δ
2
≤ α ≤ |X(0)|max , b ∈ {−1, 1}n
}
.
For any Xˆ ∈ M , since Xˆ satisfies social balance (see
Theorem 3.4) and mini,j |Xˆij | ≥ δ/2 > 0, there ex-
ists an open neighbor set defined as U(Xˆ) = {X =
Xˆ + ∆ | |∆|max < mini,j |Xˆij |} such that any X ∈ U(Xˆ)
satisfies social balance. According to Heine-Borel theo-
rem, there exists a finite set {Xˆ1, . . . , XˆK} ⊂ M such
that M ⊂ ∪Kk=1U(Xˆk). Since ∪Kk=1U(Xˆk) is an open set,
there exists  > 0 such that the neighbor set of M , de-
fined as U(M, ) = {X ∈ S+s-symm | |X −M |max < },
satisfies that U(M, ) ⊂ ∪Kk=1U(Xˆk) and thereby any
X ∈ U(M, ) satisfies social balance.
Since X(t) → M as t → ∞, there exists t0 ∈ Z≥0
such thatX(t) ∈ U(M, ) for any t ≥ t0. Therefore,X(t)
satisfies social balance for any t ≥ t0, which concludes
the proof for (ii)(a)⇒ (ii)(b).
Now we prove (ii)(b)⇒ (ii)(c). Suppose G(X(t0))
satisfies social balance for some t0 > 0. If |X(t0)|max =|X(t0)|min, then there exists some α > 0 such
that X(t0) = αB, where B ∈ {−1, 1}n×n. Since
G
(
X(t0)
)
satisfies social balance, we have Bii > 0 and
Bj∗ = ±B1∗, which in turn implies that B = B>1∗B1∗ =
sign(X1∗(t0))> sign(X1∗(t0)). Therefore, X(t0) is al-
ready a rank-one fixed point in the set Qhomophily.
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Suppose G
(
X(t0)
)
satisfies social balance but
|X(t0)|max > |X(t0)|min. For any t ≥ t0, let |Xpq(t)| =|X(t)|min. We have that, for any i and j,
|Xjp(t+ 1)| = 1‖Xj∗(t)‖1
n∑
k=1
|Xjk(t)||Xpk(t)|
≤ |Xjq(t)|‖Xj∗(t)‖1 |Xpq(t)|+
(
1− |Xjq(t)|‖Xj∗(t)‖1
)
|X(t)|max
≤ |X(t)|max −
|Xjq(t)|
‖Xj∗(t)‖1
( |X(t)|max − |X(t)|min )
≤ |X(t)|max−
|X(t)|min
n |X(t)|max
( |X(t)|max−|X(t)|min ),
and, similarly,
|Xij(t+ 2)| = 1‖Xi∗(t+1)‖1
n∑
k=1
|Xik(t+1)||Xjk(t+1)|
≤ |Xip(t+ 1)|‖Xi∗(t+ 1)‖1 |Xjp(t+ 1)|
+
(
1− |Xip(t+ 1)|‖Xi∗(t+ 1)‖1
)
|X(t+ 1)|max
≤ |Xip(t+1)|‖Xi∗(t+1)‖1 |Xjp(t+1)|+
(
1− |Xip(t+1)|‖Xi∗(t+1)‖1
)
|X(t)|max
= |X(t)|max −
|Xip(t+1)|
‖Xi∗(t+1)‖1
( |X(t)|max − |Xjp(t+1)|)
≤ |X(t)|max
− |X(t+ 1)|min
n |X(t+ 1)|max
|X(t)|min
n |X(t)|max
(|X(t)|max−|X(t)|min)
≤ |X(t)|max−
|X(t)|2min
n2 |X(t)|2max
( |X(t)|max−|X(t)|min).
Therefore,
|X(t+ 2)|max − |X(t+ 2)|min
≤
(
1− |X(t)|
2
min
n2 |X(t)|2max
)( |X(t)|max − |X(t)|min )
≤
(
1− |X(t0)|
2
min
n2 |X(t0)|2max
)( |X(t)|max − |X(t)|min ).
Now we have established the exponential convergence of
|X(t)|max−|X(t)|min to 0. Therefore, there exists α > 0
such that limt→∞ |Xij(t)| = α for any i, j. Moreover,
since sign(X(t)) = sign(X(t0)) for any t ≥ t0, we have
limt→∞X(t) = αbb>, where b = sign(X1∗(t0))>. This
concludes the proof for (ii)(b)⇒ (ii)(c).
The proof for (ii)(b)⇒ (ii)(a) is straightforward. If
G
(
X(t0)
)
satisfies social balance, then, according to
claim C.2), |X(t)|min ≥ |X(t0)|min for any t ≥ t0, which
means that lim inf
t→∞ minij |Xij(t)| ≥ |X(t0)|min > 0.
Now we prove (ii)(c)⇒ (ii)(b). Suppose X(t) → X∗
as t → ∞. For any X∗ ∈ Qhomophily of rank one, there
exists α > 0 and b ∈ {−1, 1}n such that X∗ = αbb>.
Since α > 0, there exists a neighbor set U(X∗) such that
for any X ∈ U(X∗), signX = signX∗, which implies
that, for any X ∈ U(X∗), G(X) satisfies social balance.
Moreover, since X(t) → X∗, there exists t0 > 0 such
that X(t) ∈ U(X∗) for any t ≥ t0. Therefore, G
(
X(t)
)
achieves social balance at t0. This concludes the proof.
As Theorem 3.7 points out, the appraisal matrix X(t)
converge to some rank-one matrix αbb> if and only if
X(t) achieves social balance (see Defintiion 2.1) at some
time t0. The mathematical intuition behind the conver-
gence to rank-one matrices is that, after achieving social
balance, the quantity maxij |Xij(t)| − mink` |Xk`(t)| is
monotonically vanishing. In reality, various factors such
as noisy disturbances and individual prejudice (see [12])
may prevent the appraisal matrix from converging to
rank-one matrices.
Monte-Carlo validation of the non-vanishing appraisal
condition indicates that statement (ii)(b) of Theorem 3.7
holds for generic initial conditions. The detailed simula-
tion results are presented in Section 5. In fact, there ex-
ist some counter examples of X(0) with which the non-
vanishing condition on the solution X(t) does not hold.
Example 1 : if X(0) is block-diagonal, then the dynam-
ics of the blocks are decoupled. While statement (ii) of
Theorem 3.7 still holds block-wisely, the non-vanishing
condition on the entire matrix X(t) does not hold; Ex-
ample 2 : if all the off-diagonal entries of X(0) ∈ Rn×n
are equal to some −b < 0 and all the diagonal entries
are equal to a = (n− 2)b/2, one can check by computa-
tion that X(1) becomes a diagonal matrix with strictly
positive diagonals, i.e., X(1) is a rank-n fixed point
and therefore the non-vanishing condition does not hold.
However, for both Example 1 and 2, the sets of initial
conditions are zero-measure and simulation results in-
dicate that the zero-pattern of X(t) with those specifi-
cally constructed X(0) are not robust under perturba-
tion: For Example 1, if X(0) has two diagonal blocks,
any perturbation of any of its zero-entries render the
convergence of X(t) to a rank-one matrix, and there-
fore the non-vanishing appraisal condition holds again;
For Example 2, under any perturbation of any entry of
X(0), X(t) converges to a rank-one matrix and the non-
vanishing appraisal condition holds as well. Moreover,
even for Example 1 and 2, the systems are still well-
behaved and the solutions X(t) achieve social balance
with k isolated subgraphs, as defined in Remark 3.5.
We end this section with some remarks on the
homophily-based model.
Remark 3.8 (Sufficient conditions for non-vanishing
appraisals). Since the non-vanishing appraisal condi-
tion is satisfied if X(t) achieves social balance at fi-
nite time, by writing down the closed-form expressions
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of X(1) and X(2) and applying Lemma 2.2, we ob-
tain the following sufficient conditions on the initial
appraisals X for non-vanishing appraisals: (i) either
(Xi∗X>1∗)(X1∗X
>
j∗)(Xi∗X
>
j∗) > 0 for any i, j, (ii) or
(Xi∗X>XX>1∗)(X1∗X
>XX>j∗)(Xi∗X
>XX>j∗) > 0 for
any i, j. Here the condition (i) ((ii) resp.) corresponds
to the case when X(1) (X(2) resp.) is structurally bal-
anced. For both condition (i) and (ii), the set of initial
appraisal matrices X have non-zero measure.
Remark 3.9. Our homophily-based model exhibits
the following somehow unrealistic behavior: for any
X(0) ∈ Snz-row, the solution X(t) immediately becomes
sign-symmetric at time step 1. However, if we adopt a
simple modification by considering individual memory,
i.e., if the dynamics are given by
X(t+ 1) =  fhomophily(X(t)) + (1− )X(t), (6)
for some  ∈ (0, 1], then, following the same argument
as in the proofs for Proposition 3.3, Theorem 3.4, and
Theorem 3.7, we conclude that
(i) The set Spos-diag = {X ∈ Rn×n |Xii > 0 for any i}
is invariant under dynamics (6);
(ii) Theorem 3.4 still holds, while statements (ii)-(iv) of
Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 3.7 still hold for any
X(0) ∈ Spos-diag.
The proof is provided in the technical report [30].
4 Influence-based Model
In this section, we propose the influence-based model
(IbM) and present some important theoretical results
parallel to the results on the homophily-based model.
Definition 4.1 (Influence-based model). Given an
initial appraisal matrix X(0) ∈ S+rs-symm ⊂ Rn×n, the
influence-based model is defined by:
X(t+ 1) = diag(|X(t)|1n)−1X(t)X(t). (7)
Remark 4.2 (Interpretation). Compared with the
homophily-based model (4), the only difference here is
that the term X(t)X(t)> on the right-hand side of (4)
is changed to X(t)X(t). Equation (7) now describes
an interpersonal influence process: Individuals adjust
their appraisals of each other via the opinion dynamics
X(t+ 1) = W (t)X(t). Here the opinion of each individ-
ual is how she/he appraise every one in the group, and
each Wij(t) denotes the weight that individual i assigns
to individual j’s opinions. The construction of the in-
fluence matrix W (t) = diag
(|X(t)|1n)−1X(t) implies
that the interpersonal influences are proportional to the
interpersonal appraisals.
Next, we present some results on the invariant set and
finite-time behavior of the influence-based model.
Proposition 4.3 (Finite-time Properties of the
IbM). Consider the dynamical system (7) and de-
fine finfluence(X) = diag(|X|1n)−1XX. Pick any
X0 ∈ S+rs-symm. The following statements hold:
(i) the map finfluence is well-defined for anyX ∈ Snz-row
and maps S+rs-symm to S+rs-symm;
(ii) the solution X(t), t ∈ Z≥0, to equation (7) from
initial condition X(0) = X0 exists and is unique;
(iii) the max norm of X(t) satisfies
|X(t+ 1)|max ≤ |X(t)|max ≤ |X(0)|max ;
(iv) for any c > 0, the trajectory cX(t) is the solution to
equation (7) from initial condition X(0) = cX0.
Proof. Denote X+ = finfluence(X) for simplicity. Fol-
lowing the same argument as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.3, we know that finfluence is well-defined for any
X ∈ Snz-row. For any X ∈ S+rs-symm, there exists γ  0n
such that diag(γ)X = X> diag(γ). Therefore,
X+ii =
1
‖Xi∗‖1
∑
k
XikXki=
1
‖Xi∗‖1
∑
k
γi
γk
X2ik>0, and
X+ij =
1
‖Xi∗‖1
γj
γi
∑
k
XjkXki=
‖Xj∗‖1γj
‖Xi∗‖1γi X
+
ji .
Let γ˜ = diag
(|X|1n)γ, then we have diag(γ˜)X+ =
X+
>
diag(γ˜). Therefore, X+ = finfluence(X) ∈
S+rs-symm. This concludes the proof of statement (i).
Statements (ii) is a direct consequence of statement (i).
Moreover,
∣∣X+ij ∣∣ = 1‖Xi∗‖1
∣∣∣∑
k
XikXkj
∣∣∣ ≤ 1‖Xi∗‖1 ∑
k
|Xik||Xkj |
≤ max
k
|Xkj | ≤ |X|max
immediately lead to statement (iii). Statement (iv) is a
straightforward observation obtained from equation (7).
Notice that Snz-row is not an invariant set of the map
finfluence. For example,
X(0) =
[
1 2
−0.5 −1
]
∈ Snz-row
leads toX(1) /∈ Snz-row and, moreover, finfluence(X(1)) is
not defined. For the influence-based model, we consider
S+rs-symm as the domain of system (7) due to its invariance
under the map finfluence. According to Proposition 4.3,
for anyX(0) ∈ S+rs-symm, each entry of |X(t)| is uniformly
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upper bounded, which is a desired property the previous
models in [27,34] do not have.
The following theorem characterizes the set of fixed
points of the map finfluence in S+rs-symm.
Theorem 4.4 (Fixed points and social balance). Con-
sider system (7) in domain S+rs-symm. Define
Qinfluence
=
{
PY P> ∈ S+rs-symm
∣∣∣P is a permutation matrix,
Y is a block diagonal matrix with blocks of the
form sign(w)w>, w ∈ Rm and |w|  0m,m ≤ n
}
.
Then the following statements hold:
(i) Qinfluence is the set of all the fixed points of sys-
tem (7) in domain S+rs-symm,
(ii) for anyX ∈ Qinfluence,G(X) is composed by isolated
complete subgraphs that satisfy social balance.
Proof. We first prove that any X∗ ∈ Qinfluence is a fixed
point of system (7). For any w ∈ Rn such that |w|  0n,
the matrix Y = sign(w)w> satisfies
finfluence(Y )
= diag(| sign(w)w>|1n)−1(sign(w)w>)(sign(w)w>)
= sign(w)w> = Y.
Therefore, Y = sign(w)w> is a fixed point of system (7).
A simple observation is that, if Y is a block diagonal
matrix and each block takes the form sign(w)w>, then
Y is a fixed point of finfluence. Moreover, given any fixed
point Y , for any permutation matrix P ∈ Rn×n, since
PY P> = P diag(|Y |1n)−1Y Y P>
= diag(|PY P>|1n)−1(PY P>)(PY P>)
= finfluence(PY P
>),
any X∗ ∈ Qinfluence is a fixed point of finfluence.
Since, for any Y = sign(w)w> with |w|  0, we have
YjkYk`Y`j = |wjwkw`| > 0, following the same line of
argument in the proof for Theorem 3.4(ii), we conclude
that any X∗ ∈ Qinfluence is associated with a graph
G(X∗) composed by isolated complete subgraphs that
satisfy social balance. This proves statement (ii).
Now we prove by induction that Qinfluence is actually
the set of all the fixed point of system (7) in S+rs-symm.
We adopt the notations θi and Xj∗,θi in the same way
as defined in the proof of Theorem 3.4, and, in addition,
define X∗j,θi as the j-th column of X with all the k-th
entry such that k /∈ θi removed. One can check that the
trivial case of n = 1 is true. Suppose statement (i) holds
for any system with dimension n˜ < n.
For system (7) with dimension n, suppose X ∈
S+rs-symm is a fixed point of the system (7), i.e.,
X = finfluence(X). For any given j,
|Xij | = 1‖Xi∗‖1
∣∣∣∑
k
XikXkj
∣∣∣ ≤ 1‖Xi∗‖1 ∑
k
|Xik||Xkj |
≤ max
k
|Xkj |, for any i,
and there exists some i such that |Xij | = maxk |Xkj |.
Now we discuss two cases that cover all the possible X’s.
Case 1: |Xjj | = maxk |Xkj | and |Xij | < maxk |Xkj |
for any i 6= j. Since X ∈ S+rs-symm, X is sign-symmetric,
|Xjj | = 1‖Xj∗‖1
∑
k
|Xjk||Xkj | = max
k
|Xkj |.
Due to the second equality in the equations above,
|Xkj | = max` |X`j | for any k ∈ θj . Therefore, in Case
1, i /∈ θj for any i 6= j, which in turn implies that
Xji = Xij = 0 for any i 6= j. As the consequence, there
exists a permutation matrix P such that
PXP> =
[
Xjj 0>n−1
0n−1 X˜
]
,
where X˜ is an (n − 1) × (n − 1) matrix. Following the
same line of argument in the Case 1 of the proof of The-
orem 3.4, we conclude that X ∈ Qinfluence.
Case 2: there exists i 6= j such that |Xij | =
maxk |Xkj |. For such i, we have j ∈ θi. In addition, the
equality below
|Xij | = 1‖Xi∗‖1
∣∣∣∑
k
XikXkj
∣∣∣ = max
k
|Xkj |
leads to the following two results:
R.1) sign(Xi∗,θi) = ± sign(X>∗j,θi);
R.2) |Xkj | = max` |X`j | for any k ∈ θi.
Result R.2) and j ∈ θi lead to |Xjj | = max` |X`j |. There-
fore, for any k ∈ θj , |Xkj | = max` |X`j |. Moreover, since
X is sign-symmetric, for any k /∈ θj , Xjk = Xkj = 0.
For any i ∈ θj , since
|Xij | = 1‖Xi∗‖1
∣∣∣∑
k
XikXkj
∣∣∣ = max
`
|X`j |,
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we have |Xkj | = max` |X`j | for any k ∈ θi. Since
max` |X`j | > 0 for any X ∈ S+rs-symm and Xkj = 0 for
any k ∈ θj , we have θi ⊂ θj .
For any given i ∈ θj , sinceX ∈ S+rs-symm, we know that
Xii > 0 and Xji > 0. Apply the same argument for the
j-th column in Case 2 to the i-th column, we conclude
that Xii = max` |X`i| and |Xji| = max` |X`i|, the latter
of which in turn implies that |Xki| = max` |X`i| for any
k ∈ θj . Moreover, sinceXii = max` |X`i| leads to |Xki| =
max` |X`i| for any k ∈ θi and Xik = Xki = 0 for any
k /∈ θi, we have θj ⊂ θi. Since we already get θi ⊂ θj ,
we conclude that θj = θi for any i ∈ θj . Now we have
proved that graph G(X) can be partitioned into two
isolated subgraphs with the node sets θj and {1, . . . , n}\
θj respectively. In addition, due to Result R.1) and the
facts that θi = θj and X is sign-symmetric, we obtain
that sign(Xi∗, θj) = sign(X>∗i,θj ) = ± sign(X>∗j,θj ) for all
i ∈ θj .
Taking together all the results we have obtained for
Case 2, we conclude that, for any given j in Case 2: (1)
|Xkj | = max` |X`j | for any k ∈ θj and Xkj = Xjk = 0
for any k /∈ θj ; (2) For any i ∈ θj , θi = θj . In ad-
dition, |Xki| = max` |X`i| for any k ∈ θj and Xki =
Xik = 0 for any k /∈ θj ; (3) For any i ∈ θj , sign(X∗i) =
sign(X∗j). Denote by |θj | the cardinality of θj and define
the |θj | × |θj | matrix X(θj) = sign(w(θj))w(θj)>, where
w(θj) = X>j∗,θj . If |θj | = n, then X is already of the form
sign(w)w> and thus we have X ∈ Qinfluence. If |θj | 6= n,
there exists a permutation matrix P such that
PXP> =
[
X(θj) 0|θj |×(n−|θj |)
0(n−|θj |)×|θj | X˜
]
.
Following the line of argument in Case 1, we have X ∈
Qinfluence. This concludes the proof for statement (i).
Remark 4.5. The proof of Theorem 4.4 implies that
Qinfluence is actually the set of all the fixed points of the
map finfluence in S+s-symm. However, the setQinfluence does
not contain all the fixed points in Snz-row. For example,
let X = αbb> for some α > 0 and b ∈ {−1,+1}n. Then,
pick one i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and set X∗i = 0n. It can be easily
verified that X = finfluence(X) but X /∈ Qinfluence.
Now we present the main results on the convergence
of the appraisal network to social balance.
Theorem 4.6 (Convergence and social balance in the
IbM). Consider the influence-based model given by equa-
tion (7). The following statements hold:
(i) Each element in Qinfluence of rank one is a locally
stable fixed point of finfluence;
(ii) For any X(0) ∈ S+rs-symm, the following three state-
ments are equivalent:
(a) the solutionX(t) satisfies the non-vanishing ap-
praisal condition given by Definition 3.6;
(b) there exists t0 ≥ 0 such that G(X(t)) satisfies
social balance for all t ≥ t0;
(c) there exists X∗ ∈ Qinfluence of rank one such
that limt→∞X(t) = X∗.
Proof. We start by proving the following two claims. For
any given t0 ≥ 0, if all the entries of X(t0) are non-zero
and G(X(t0)) satisfies social balance, then,
C.1) for any t ≥ t0, G(X(t)) satisfies social balance and
sign(X(t)) = sign(X(t0));
C.2) for any t ≥ t0, |X(t)|max is non-increasing and|X(t)|min is non-decreasing.
Claim C.1) is proved in the same way as in the proof of
Theorem 3.7. SupposeG(X(t0)) achieves social balance.
For any i and j, since
Xij(t0 + 1) =
1
‖Xi∗(t0)‖1
∑
k
Xik(t0)Xkj(t0),
we have
sign(Xij(t0 + 1)) = sign
(∑
k
Xik(t0)Xkj(t0)
)
.
Since G(X(t0)) achieves social balance, for any k,
sign(Xik(t0)Xkj(t0)) = sign(Xji(t0)) = sign(Xij(t0)).
Therefore, sign(X(t0 + 1)) = sign(X(t0)). This con-
cludes the proof of claim C.1).
For any t ≥ t0, since G(X(t)) satisfies social balance,
|Xij(t+ 1)| = 1‖Xi∗(t)‖1
n∑
`=1
|Xi`(t)||X`j(t)|,
for any i and j. Therefore, for any given j, the previous
expression leads to the following two inequalities:
min
`
|X`j(t + 1)| ≥ min
`
|X`j(t)|; max
`
|X`j(t + 1)| ≤
max
`
|X`j(t)|. Let |X(t)|max = maxi,j |Xij(t)| and
|X(t)|min = mini,j |Xij(t)|. We have |X(t+ 1)|max ≤|X(t)|max and |X(t+ 1)|min ≥ |X(t)|min for any t ≥ t0.
This concludes the proof of Claim C.2).
Now we prove statement (i), i.e., each Xˆ ∈ Qinfluence
with rank 1 is locally stable. Let Xˆ = sign(w)w>, where
|w|  0n. For any matrix ∆ ∈ Rn×n such that for any k ∈
{1, . . . , n}, δk = maxi |∆ik| < |wk|, we have sign(Xˆ∗k +
∆∗k) = sign(Xˆ∗k). Due to claim C.1) and the proof of
claim C.2), we know that, for X(0) = Xˆ + ∆, X(t)
satisfies that, for any t ≥ 0,
11
(1) sign(X(t)) = sign(X(0)) = sign(Xˆ);
(2) |wk|−δk≤mini |Xik(t)|≤maxi |Xik(t)|≤|wk|+δk.
Therefore, for any i,Xik(t) is of the form αik(t)sign(Xˆik),
where 0 < |wk| − δk ≤ αik(t) ≤ |wk|+ δk. We have∣∣∣X(t)− Xˆ∣∣∣
max
=max
ij
∣∣αij(t) sign(Xˆij)−|wj | sign(Xˆij)∣∣
=max
ij
∣∣αij(t)− |wj |∣∣≤δ,
where δ = max
k
δk. Therefore, for any  > 0, there exists
δ = min{maxk |wk|2 , 2} such that, for any X(0) satisfying|X(0)−X∗|max < δ, |X(t)−X∗|max <  for any t ≥ 0.
That is, Xˆ is locally stable.
Now we prove (ii)(a) ⇒ (ii)(b). For simplicity, de-
note X+ = finfluence(X). Firstly, one can easily check
that finfluence(X) is continuous for any X ∈ S+rs-symm.
Secondly, for any X(0) ∈ S+rs-symm and any given k ∈
{1, . . . , n}, according to the proof of Proposition 4.3,
‖X∗k(t)‖∞ ≤ ‖X∗k(0)‖∞ for any t ∈ Z≥0. In addition,
let δ = lim inf
t→∞ mini,j
|Xij(t)| > 0, then there exists t˜ ∈ Z≥0
such that min
i,j
|Xij(t)| ≥ δ/2 for any t ≥ t˜. Therefore,
the set
Gc =
{
X ∈ S+rs-symm
∣∣∣ min
i,j
|Xij | ≥ δ/2, and, for any k,
‖X∗k‖∞ ≤ ‖X∗k(0)‖∞
}
is a compact subset of S+rs-symm and X(t) ∈ Gc for any
t ≥ t˜. Thirdly, define V (X∗k) = ‖X∗k‖∞. The function
V is continuous on S+rs-symm and, according to the proof
of Proposition 4.3, satisfies V (X+∗k) − V (X∗k) ≤ 0 for
any X ∈ S+rs-symm. According to the extended LaSalle
invariance principle presented in Theorem 2 of [29], we
conclude that, given any X(0) ∈ S+rs-symm such that
lim inf
t→∞ mini,j
|Xij(t)| = δ, X(t) converges to the largest
invariant set M of the set E = {X ∈ Gc | V (X+∗k) −
V (X∗k) = 0 for any k}.
Now we characterize the largest invariant set M .
For any X ∈ M ⊂ E and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, V (X+∗k) =
V (X∗k) = ‖X∗k‖∞. Suppose |X+ik| = max
`
|X+`k|. Since
|X+ik| =
1
‖Xi∗‖1
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
`=1
Xi`X`k
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1‖Xi∗‖1
n∑
`=1
|Xi`||X`k| ≤ max
`
|X`k|,
(8)
we need all of these inequalities to hold with equality
Since X ∈ Gc ⊂ S+rs-symm implies |Xj`| > 0, for any
j, ` ∈ {1, . . . , n}, X must satisfy that
(a) Xi∗ andX∗k have the same or opposite sign pattern,
i.e., sign (X∗k) = sign (Xk∗) = ± sign (Xi∗),
(b) All entries of X∗k have magnitude ‖X∗k‖∞.
Moreover, since the set M is invariant, X ∈ M implies
X+ ∈ M ⊂ E, which in turn implies that, for any
p, |X+pk| =
∥∥X+∗k∥∥∞ = ‖X∗k‖∞. Following the same
argument on the conditions such that the inequali-
ties (8) become strict equalities, we know that, for any
p, sign (Xp∗) = ± sign (X>∗k) and |Xpk| = ‖X∗k‖∞ for
any k. Using these relationships, we conclude that for
any i and j, Xi∗ and Xj∗ must have the same or the
opposite sign pattern, and that |Xij | = ‖X∗j‖∞. Let
w = X>1∗. Each row of X is thereby equal to either
w> or −w>. Therefore, X is of the form X = cw>,
where c ∈ {−1, 1}n. Moreover, since all the diagonal
entries of X are positive, the column vector c must
satisfy ciwi = 1 for any i, which implies c = sign(w).
Therefore, X = sign(w)w>. Thus, since any matrix X
of the form sign(w)w>, with |w|  0n, is a fixed point
of system (7), we conclude that
M ={X = sign(w)w> | δ/2 ≤ wi ≤ |X(0)|max ,
w ∈ Rn \ {0n}, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}},
which is a compact subset of S+rs-symm. Following the
same line of argument in the proof of Theorem 3.7, we
conclude that there exists  > 0 such that any X in the
neighbor set U(M, ) satisfies social balance.
Since X(t) → M as t → ∞, there exists t0 ∈ Z≥0
such thatX(t) ∈ U(M, ) for any t ≥ t0. Therefore,X(t)
satisfies social balance for any t ≥ t0, which concludes
the proof for (ii)(a)⇒ (ii)(b).
Now we proceed to prove (ii)(b) ⇒ (ii)(c). If
G(X(t0)) satisfies social balance for some t0 and
max` |X`j(t0)| = min` |X`j(t0)| for any j, then
X(t0) = sign(X∗1(t0))X∗1(t0)> ∈ Qinfluence, which is
already a fixed point of system (7). Suppose G(X(t0))
satisfies social balance at time t0 but there exists j such
that max` |X`j(t0)| > min` |X`j(t0)|. For any t ≥ t0,
since
|Xij(t+ 1)| ≥ ‖Xi∗(t)‖1 − |X(t0)|min‖Xi∗(t)‖1
min
`
|X`j(t)|
+
|X(t0)|min
‖Xi∗(t)‖1
max
`
|X`j(t)|,
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for any i, and |Xij(t+ 1)| ≤ max` |X`j(t)|, we have that
max
`
|X`j(t+ 1)| −min
`
|X`j(t+ 1)|
≤
(
1− |X(t0)|min‖Xi∗(t)‖1
)(
max
`
|X`j(t)| −min
`
|X`j(t)|
)
≤
(
1− |X(t0)|min
n |X(t0)|max
)(
max
`
|X`j(t)| −min
`
|X`j(t)|
)
.
Therefore, for any given j, after t0, max` |X`j(t)| −
min` |X`j(t)| exponentially converges to 0. In addi-
tion, since sign(X(t)) = sign(X(t0)) for all t ≥ t0, we
conclude that X(t) converges to a matrix in the form
sign(w)w>. This concludes the proof for (ii)(b)⇒ (ii)(c).
(ii)(b) ⇒ (ii)(a) and (ii)(c) ⇒ (ii)(b) are proved fol-
lowing the same arguments as in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.7.
5 Further discussion and numerical simulations
5.1 Numerical validation of the non-vanishing ap-
praisal condition and model comparisons
Monte Carlo validation indicates that, for the
homophily-based model, the non-vanishing appraisal
condition, given by Definition 3.6, holds for generic
initial conditions in Snz-row. By generic initial condi-
tion, we mean each of X(0)’s entries is independently
randomly generated from the uniform distribution
on some support [−a, a]. Since the homophily-based
model is independent of scaling, we only need to con-
sider the support [−1, 1]. For any randomly generated
X(0) ∈ Snz-row ∩ [−1, 1]n×n, define the random variable
Z : Snz-row → {0, 1} as
Z(X(0)) =
{
1, if min
100≤t≤1000
min
i,j
|Xij(t)| ≥ 0.001,
0, otherwise.
Let p = P[Z(X(0)) = 1]. For N such independent ran-
dom samples Z1, . . . , ZN , define pˆN =
∑N
i=1 Zi/N . For
any accuracy 1− ε ∈ (0, 1) and confidence level 1− ξ ∈
(0, 1), |pˆN − p| < ε with probability greater than 1 − ξ
if the Chernoff bound is satisfied: N ≥ 12ε2 log 2ξ . For
ε = ξ = 0.01, the bound is satisfied by N = 27000. We
ran the 27000 independent simulations of the homophily-
based model with n = 8, and found that pˆ = 1. There-
fore, we conclude that, for any generic initial condition
X(0) ∈ Snz-row, with 99% confidence level, there is at
least 0.99 probability that every entry of |X(t)| is lower
bounded by a positive scalar (set to be 0.001 in this sim-
ulation) for all t ∈ {100, . . . , 10000}.
We remark that the continuous-time homophily-based
model [34] has a similar property that the interpersonal
appraisals reach social balance in finite time, however
they diverge later also in finite time.
The same Monte Carlo validation is also applied to
the influence-based model, except that now the generic
initial conditions X(0) ∈ S+rs-symm ⊂ Rn×n is gener-
ated by the following steps: 1) Randomly and indepen-
dently generate the diagonal and the upper triangular
entries of a matrix Xˆ ∈ Rn×n from the uniform distri-
bution on [−1, 1]; 2) Let Xˆij = Xˆji for any i > j; 3)
Randomly and independently generate the entries of a
n × 1 vector γ from the uniform distribution on [0, 1];
4) Let X(0) = diag(γ)Xˆ. We obtained that, for any
initial condition X(0) ∈ S+rs-symm, with 99% confidence
level, there is at least 0.99 probability that every entry
of |X(t)| is uniformly strictly lower bounded from 0 for
all t ∈ {100, . . . , 10000}.
In the continuous-time influence-like model [27,34],
when the initial appraisal matrix X(0) is a normal ma-
trix, i.e., when X(0)X(0)> = X(0)>X(0), the appraisal
network G(X(t)) almost surely reaches social balance
only in the limit case when the network size n tends to in-
finity. Compared with these models, besides the desired
convergence property, our influenced-based model has
the following advantages: 1) Unlike the set of normal ma-
trices, of which the sociological meaning is not explicit,
the almost-sure convergence to social balance in our
influence-based model holds for any X(0) = diag(γ)Xˆ,
where Xˆ is symmetric and diag(γ) has positive diago-
nals. With the term diag(γ), our model allows for in-
dividuals’ heterogeneous scaling of appraisals, which is
sociologically more reasonable; 2) In our influence-based
model, the almost-sure finite-time achievement of social
balance holds for any finite network size n.
For both homophily-based and influence-based mod-
els, Monte Carlo validations with uniform but asymmet-
ric initial appraisal distributions leads to the same re-
sults, but are not presented here due to the limit of space.
We further numerically estimate, for our influence-
based model, the probability that the non-vanishing
appraisal condition holds for generic initial conditions
X(0) ∈ Snz-row ∩ [−1, 1]n×n. According to Theorem 4.6,
this probability is also the probability that the ap-
praisal network converges to social balance. As shown in
Fig. 5.1, for the influence-based model, the probability
of converging to social balance is quite low and decays
to zero as the network size increases. Such feature indi-
cates that, if system (4) and (7) correctly characterize
the homophily and influence mechanisms respectively,
then the homophily mechanism is a more universal ex-
planation for the convergence of appraisal networks to
social balance. That is, it is more probable that the em-
pirically observed structurally balanced social networks
are formed via the homophily mechanism rather than
the influence mechanism.
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Fig. 1. Error-bar plot of the estimated probability of converg-
ing to social balance for both the homophily-based model
and the influence model. For each network size, we run 1000
realizations, each with an initial condition X(0) randomly
generated from Snz-row∩ [−1.1]n×n in the same way as in the
first paragraph of Section 5.1. Numerical convergence is de-
termined by whether the non-vanishing appraisal condition
holds. The error bars are taken as the estimated standard
deviations of the probability estimation and turn our to be
very small (0 for the homophily-based model).
no link added t = 0 t = 1 t = 5
Fig. 2. Visualization of the evolution of the appraisal ma-
trix under perturbations in the homophily-based model. For
each entry, the dark gray color indicates a negative appraisal,
while the light gray indicates a positive one. The white color
indicate no appraisal. The appraisal network has 11 nodes
and is initially in a social balance state with 3 isolated sub-
graphs. With 6 links (4 positive and 2 negative links) added
to the network, the appraisal network evolves to a single–
clique structurally balanced state after 5 iterations.
5.2 Social balance under perturbation
For the homophily model, extensive simulation obser-
vations indicate that social balance with k > 1 isolated
subgraphs is unstable under perturbations. With some
links added to the network, the subnetworks connected
by the added links merge into larger subnetworks and the
perturbed network converges to another balanced state
with fewer isolated subgraphs, see Fig. 2 as an example
and the following two insightful scenarios.
Example 1: (Globalization of local conflicts) Consider
the appraisal network with two isolated subgraphs. Each
subgraph is structurally balanced and made up of two
antagonistic factions. The two factions in subgraph 1 are
node sets V1 and V2 respectively, while the two factions
in subgraph 2 are V3 and V4 respectively. Suppose one
link with weight η is added from one node in V1 to one
node in V3. By computing the closed form expression of
X(2), we obtain that the perturbed appraisal network
always recovers to a complete and structurally balanced
network composed of two antagonistic factions. More-
over, if η > 0, then the two factions are V1 ∪ V3 and
V2 ∪ V4; If η < 0, then the two factions are V1 ∪ V4 and
-
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Fig. 3. Visual illustration of the behavior of the social bal-
ance with 2 isolated subgraphs with the addition of one in-
ter-subgraph link.
V2∪V3. Figure 3 visualizes the behavior described above.
In reality, such behavior could be interpreted as the es-
calation of local conflicts. One real example of such phe-
nomena is the formation of the globalized conflicts be-
tween the Axis and the Ally in World War II, after the
Nazi German allied with the Imperial Japan.
Example 2: (Competition for ally and mediation of con-
flicts) Consider an appraisal network with two isolated
subgraphs: subgraph 1 with two antagonistic factions
V1 = {1, . . . , n1} and V2 = {n1+1, . . . , n1+n2}, and sub-
graph 2 with only one faction V3 = {n1+n2+1, . . . , n1+
n2 + n3}. Suppose the appraisal matrix associated with
subgraph 1 is given by αbb>, where b = (1>n1 ,−1>n2)>,
and α > 0 represents the sentiment strength inside sub-
graph 1. Similarly, the appraisal matrix associated with
subgraph 2 is given by αˆbˆbˆ>, where bˆ = 1n3 and αˆ >
0 represents the sentiment strength inside subgraph 2.
Imagine then that both V1 and V2 aim to ally with V3.
Accordingly, suppose that, in order to ally with V3, each
node in V1 builds a bilateral link with each node in V3,
with link weight 1 > 0, while each node in V2 builds a
bilateral link with each node in V3 with weight 2 > 0.
With all these links added, the associated appraisal ma-
trix takes the following form:
X(0) =

α1n11
>
n1 −α1n11>n2 11n11>n3
−α1n21>n1 α1n21>n2 21n21>n3
11n31n1 21n31
>
n1 αˆ1n31
>
n3
 .
Along the evolution of X(t) determined by X(0), we
obtain the following numerical results.
(i) If 1n1 > 2n2, i.e., faction V1 takes greater effort
than V2 in allying with V3, then V1 gains at least one ally,
either V2 or V3. Moreover, the following conditions 1n1−
2n2 ≥ αˆ2n3/α and 12n3 ≤ α2(n1 + n2) guarantee
that V1 ally with V3; This statement also holds when all
the subscripts 1 and 2 are switched;
(ii) If 12n3 ≤ α2(n1 + n2), then V3 eventually gains
at least one ally. That is, V3 avoids the situation in which
V1 and V2 end up allying with each other against V3;
(iii) Any of the following conditions guarantees that
no negative link exists in the asymptotic appraisal net-
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work: (1) 12n3 ≥ α2(n1 + n2) and 1n1 − 2n2 = 0;
(2) 12n3 ≥ α2(n1 + n2) and 0 < 1n1 − 2n2 ≤ 2αˆn3;
(3) 12n3 ≥ α2(n1 + n2) and 0 < 2n2 − 1n1 ≤ 1αˆn3.
Notice that the inequality 12n3 ≥ α2(n1 + n2) is re-
quired for all the three sufficient conditions. The right-
hand side of this inequality above reflects the “scale” of
the conflicts between factions V1 and V2, while the left-
hand side is V1 and V2’s average efforts in allying with
V3, multiplied by the size of V3. From the three sufficient
conditions, we learn that, the larger the size of V3, the
more capable it is of mediating the conflicts between V1
and V2. In addition, V1 and V2’s strong willingness to
ally with V3, as well as the sentiment strength inside V3,
i.e., αˆ, also help mediate the conflicts.
5.3 Distribution of initial conditions and formation of
factions in the homophily-based model
We investigate numerically, for the homophily-based
model, how initial appraisal distribution determines
whether the appraisal network evolves to only one
faction or two antagonistic factions. We randomly
and independently sample the entries of X(0) from
the uniform distribution on [xmin, xmax], for which
ave(xmin, xmax) = (xmax + xmin)/2 indicates how
the initial appraisals are biased towards being posi-
tive. We set xmax − xmin = 2 and change the values
of ave(xmin, xmax) and the number of agents. Given
[xmin, xmax], 30 samples of the initial condition X(0)
are independently randomly generated and for each
X(0) we count how many factions appear at X(500).
Since any X(0) and −X(0) lead to the same X(1) and
X(t) thereafter, we only consider different values of
ave(xmin, xmax) ≥ 0. Figure 4 shows that, for fixed net-
work size, the smaller the value of ave(xmin, xmax), the
more likely it is to find two antagonistic factions; for
fixed value of ave(xmin, xmax), the larger the network
size, the more likely that only one faction emerges.
Note that similar numerical study in [27] for the
continuous-time influence-like model indicates that, the
appraisal network evolves to two antagonistic factions if
the initial mean appraisal is non-positive. The appraisal
network evolves to all-friendly state if the initial mean
is positive. However, such results in [27] only hold for
the limit case of infinitely large network size n.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes both homophily-based and
influence-based discrete-time models for the bounded
evolution of interpersonal appraisal networks towards
social balance. For either model, the set of fixed points
include all the possible balanced configurations, in the
sense of sign pattern, of the appraisal network. Un-
der the non-vanishing appraisal condition, we prove
that both models exhibit asymptotic convergence to
3 100 200 300
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Fig. 4. Formation of factions under different initial condi-
tion distributions for the homophily-based model. The white
color indicates the presence of two factions in all the 30 ran-
dom samples, while the dark gray color indicates the pres-
ence of one faction in all of the samples. The light gray color
indicates any other case.
structurally balanced networks, while the convergence
property holds for larger initial conditions set in the
homophily-based model than in the influence-based
model. Moreover, our models admits the existence of
multiple isolated subgraphs in the final structure of the
evolved appraisal network. Numerical study indicates
how the final emergence of factions in the social net-
work is sensitive to the initial appraisal distribution,
and how the system transits from one fixed point to
another under perturbations.
We remark that our models and the previous
continuous-time models [23,27,34,20] all adopt the defi-
nition of social balance for complete graphs, or isolated
complete subgraphs in our paper, which implies that in-
dividuals interact with everyone in the group/subgroup.
This assumption limit the scope of the application of
our models to (groups of) small-size groups, which are
usually assumed to be complete graphs.
Possible future research directions include a better
understanding of the influence-based model for arbi-
trary initial conditions, a validation of the proposed
models with laboratory and/or field data, the study of
asynchronous models with pairwise updates, and fur-
ther study of conditions and cases in which one socio-
psychological mechanism dominates the other.
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